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The United States Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 has been 
considered one of the most important cases of modern administrative 
law. 2  This seminal case marked the birth of the well-recognized 
Chevron deference standard, which determines how far an agency 
can go in interpreting the law.   
Before the Supreme Court took up the issue in City of 
Arlington v. FCC, 3  however, there was a longstanding dispute 
regarding whether courts should apply Chevron deference when 
reviewing an agency’s interpretation of their own so-called 
“jurisdiction.”4  In other words, may administrative agencies receive 
Chevron deference when interpreting the scope of their own 
regulatory authority?   
This note analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in City of 
Arlington and discusses its impact upon the field of administrative 
law.  Part II outlines the history of Chevron deference and the 
principles of administrative law at work in this case.  Part III details 
the facts, the background of the Communications Act of 1934—
Section 332(c)(7) in particular—and the procedural history of the 
case.  Part IV presents and discusses the Court’s majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions.  Part V discusses the impact of 
the City of Arlington decision on modern administrative law, and Part 
VI concludes the note.  
 
                                               
1 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2 See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and 
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); see also Antonin 
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 512 (1989) (“Chevron has proven a highly important decision—perhaps 
the most important in the field of administrative law since Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. NRDC.”).  Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 
519 (1978). 
3 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
4 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Law’s Development Prior to Chevron 
 
Courts have long been called upon to determine when and 
how much deference should be given to an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of legislation that it is charged with administering.5  
Prior to its decision in Chevron, the Supreme Court applied diverse 
deference standards to agency interpretations of regulations and had 
failed to articulate a systematic doctrine. 6   As noted by George 
Washington University Law Professor Richard Pierce, the pre-
Chevron judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes7 that the 
agency implemented could be “characterized by pervasive 
inconsistency and unpredictability.”8   
NLRB v. Hearst Publications9 represented one of the Supreme 
Court’s first attempts at establishing guidelines for deference to 
agency interpretations.  In this case, publishers of four Los Angeles 
daily newspapers refused to bargain collectively with a union 
representing newsboys who distributed their papers on the streets of 
that city.10   The principal question that confronted the Court was 
whether the newsboys were “employees” because Congress did not 
explicitly define the term. 11   Reversing the Ninth Circuit, a five-
justice majority of the Court upheld the National Labor Relations 
                                               
5 As early as 1810, in United States v. Vowell, the Supreme Court wrote, “If 
the question had been doubtful, the court would have respected the uniform 
construction which it is understood has been given by the treasury department of 
the United States upon similar questions.”  United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. 368, 
372 (1810). 
6  See Russell L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U.L. 
REV. 411, 413 (1992); see also Scalia, supra note 2, at 516 (“An ambiguity in a 
statute committed to agency interpretation can be attributed to either of two 
congressional desires: (1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear 
about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave 
its resolution to the agency. . . .  As I read the history of developments in this field, 
the pre-Chevron decisions sought to choose between (1) and (2) on a statute-by-
statute basis.”). 
7 This review differs in substance from the standard of review courts apply for 
legislative pronouncements.   
8 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 87 (Foundation Press 2008). 
9 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
10 Id. at 113. 
11 Id. at 120. 
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Board’s (NLRB) interpretation of the term and instructed reviewing 
courts to defer to an agency’s construction of a statute that is 
administered by the agency if it had “a reasonable basis in law.”12 
A few months earlier, however, a six-justice majority of the 
Supreme Court, in the same term, decided Davies Warehouse Co. v. 
Bowles and reached an opposite conclusion regarding deference.13  In 
Davies, the Court chose to ignore the agency’s interpretation of a 
statutory term—“public utility”—which Congress had failed to 
define.14  Even though the scope of the term was ambiguous and the 
agency’s interpretation was sensible, the Court decided to follow its 
own “reasonable view” instead of deferring to the agency 
interpretation.15   
Later in the same year, the Supreme Court decided Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 16  which brought further confusion to the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the deference issue.  In Skidmore, the plaintiffs, 
who were firemen, elevator operators, or relief firemen, orally agreed 
that, in addition to their regular eight-hour duties, they would stay 
overnight three and a half to four nights each week to answer fire 
alarms.17  During their time of employment, there were no fires and 
few alarms.18  Under the labor administrator’s interpretations of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the plaintiffs were not entitled to 
recover overtime compensation for sleeping overnight on the 
premises of the company,19 and thus the plaintiffs sued.20   
Reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Skidmore Court held that the 
interpretations and opinions of the labor administrator were “entitled 
to respect,” but were “not controlling upon the courts.”21  Writing for 
the majority of the Court, Justice Jackson stated, “The weight 
[accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will 
                                               
12 Id. at 131. 
13 Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944). 
14 Id. at 156. 
15 Id. at 151–52, 156.  Besides Davies, there were other cases where the Court 
applied inconsistent standards regarding deference to agencies’ interpretations.  
See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947) (holding that 
the NLRB’s adjudicative opinions addressing whether company forepersons could 
be classified as “employees” were not entitled to deference).   
16 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
17 Id. at 135. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 136. 
20 Id. at 135–36. 
21 Id. at 140. 
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depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”22  One commentator noted 
that Skidmore established a principle of “cautious deference” to 
agency interpretations.23 
Therefore, prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court’s 
inconsistencies on the issue of agency interpretation weaved “a 
pattern of wavering between strong and weak deference” that would 
continue for over four decades.24  The lack of clarity in the Court 
rulings imposed many adverse effects on the parties who litigated the 
matter.  In the words of Justice Scalia, the pre-Chevron Court’s 
“statute-by-statute evaluation” approach created “a font of 
uncertainty and litigation.”25  
 
B. The Establishment of Chevron Deference 
 
In June 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron and issued 
what many feel was the single most definitive instruction regarding 
deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes.26  In 
Chevron, an environmental advocacy group challenged an 
Environment Protection Agency (EPA) interpretation of the term 
“stationary source” as used in the Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments 
of 1977.27  The principal issue was whether the EPA’s ruling, which 
allowed “[s]tates to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within 
the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a 
single ‘bubble,’” was a reasonable interpretation of the statutory term 
“stationary source.”28 
                                               
22 Id. 
23 Jamie A. Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial Deference 
to Agency Interpretations After EEOC v. Aramco, 42 DUKE L.J. 166, 166 (1992). 
24 Naaman A. Fiola, Christensen v. Harris County: Pumping Chevron for All 
It’s Worth—Defining the Limits of Chevron Deference, 21 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. 
L. JUDGES 151, 154 (2001); see also John G. Osborn, Legal Philosophy and 
Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 116 
(1999). 
25 Scalia, supra note 2, at 516. 
26 See sources cited supra note 2; see also sources cited infra note 41. 
27 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 
(1984). 
28 Id. at 840. 
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Through the amended CAA, Congress imposed certain 
requirements on states that had not satisfied the national air quality 
standards established by the EPA in accordance with earlier 
legislation. 29   Those “nonattainment” states 30  were required to 
establish a permit program regulating “new or modified major 
stationary sources” of air pollution.31  Both prior to and following the 
amendments, however, the CAA failed to define the term “stationary 
source” for purposes of measuring pollutants.32   
The regulations the EPA promulgated in October 1981 
allowed a state to adopt a plant-wide definition of the term 
“stationary source” instead of classifying each of its pollution-
emitting devices as individual stationary sources. 33   This 
interpretation, which became known as the “bubble” theory, allowed 
states to increase pollution in one area of their facility so long as 
there was an equivalent decrease in another area.34 
Taking into consideration that Congress did not define 
“stationary source,” and this particular issue was not addressed in the 
legislative history, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the EPA’s 
interpretation of the term and upheld its policy.35  In arriving at such 
a conclusion, the Court adopted a two-prong test to determine 
whether a reviewing court should defer to an agency’s construction 
of a statute. 36   The two questions that reviewing courts need to 
consider are: 
 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.  If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
                                               
29 Id. at 837. 
30 “Nonattainment” states were those states that had not achieved the national 
air quality standards established by the EPA.  Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 841.  
33 Id. at 837. 
34 Id. at 837, 840. 
35 Id. at 859–66. 
36 Id. at 842–43. 
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construction on the statute, as would be necessary in 
the absence of an administrative interpretation.  
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.37 
 
By identifying a two-step analysis, the Supreme Court 
established a new standard for reviewing how far an agency can go in 
interpreting the law.38  Chevron initiated a rather clear and unified 
rule in determining the agency’s interpreting authority when the 
statute under its administration is unclear or ambiguous.  Reviewing 
courts must presume that Congress has granted the agency authority 
to fill in the gaps as long as the agency’s interpretation is not 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 39   In 
other words, the agency’s interpretation does not have to be the best 
choice out there; instead it just needs to meet a low threshold of 
“reasonableness” under the circumstances. 
The impact of Chevron deference on the field of 
administrative law is well-recognized and long-lasting.  One 
commentator noted: 
  
Since its publication, Chevron has been the controlling 
case in the area of judicial deference to administrative 
interpretations and rules.  The decision has become 
the basis for any evaluation of the allocation of 
authority among administrative agencies, the federal 
courts, and state courts.  Chevron essentially 
proclaimed that when the plain words of a statute are 
ambiguous, it is the sole province of the 
administrative agency responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of that statute to determine precisely 
what the law says.40 
 
                                               
37 Id.  
38 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), marked the 
birth of the well-known Chevron deference.   
39 Id. at 844. 
40 A. Michael Nolan, State Agency-Based v. Central Panel Jurisdictions: Is 
There a Deference?, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 15 (2009). 
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Therefore, Chevron represents a significant departure from the “case-
by-case evaluation” approach adopted by pre-Chevron courts.41  For 
instance, prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court ruled in Skidmore that 
an agency’s rulings, interpretations and opinions were not necessarily 
controlling. 42   Chevron makes it clear that reviewing courts are 
required to defer to the agency’s interpretation when it is reasonable.   
 
C. The Application of Chevron Deference 
 
Chevron deference is based upon the notion that the agency to 
which Congress has delegated authority to administer the law is 
“often in the best position to interpret that scheme.”43  In reaching its 
decision in Chevron, the Supreme Court relied upon “agency 
accountability and agency expertise to justify judicial deference to 
agency interpretations of regulations.”44  Despite the clear principles 
established in Chevron, in the post-Chevron era, the Court has not 
applied Chevron deference to all agency interpretations of statutes.   
 
1. Limitations on the Chevron Framework 
 
As mentioned earlier, in Chevron, the Supreme Court 
deferred to the EPA’s interpretation contained in CAA, a legislative 
regulation. 45   Legislative rules are established through Congress’s 
grant of power to agencies, which have the binding effects of 
statutes. 46   These legislative rules are different from interpretive 
                                               
41 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 
YALE L.J. 969, 971 (1992) (“Chevron is widely understood to mark a significant 
transformation in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of deference”); see also 
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453–55 (1989) (concluding that the 
establishment of Chevron deference “announced the end of judicial vacillation 
between two principal interpretive models”). 
42 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).   
43 Weaver & Schweitzer, supra note 6, at 419. 
44 Jonathon T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: 
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 100–01 (2000). 
45  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840 
(1984). 
46  Yavelberg, supra note 23, at 167–68; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 2 ADMIN. L. REV. 547 
(2000). 
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rules, which are made by agencies without Congress’s grant of 
power.47  “An agency may issue [interpretive rules] in a variety of 
formats, including manuals, policy statements, staff instructions, 
opinion letters, audits, correspondence, guidelines, press releases, and 
internal memoranda.”48 
In addition to mandating deference to agency interpretations 
of legislative rules, the Supreme Court has also at times given 
Chevron deference to non-legislative rules.  For instance, in Auer v. 
Robbins, the Court granted deference to the Secretary of Labor’s 
interpretation contained in the form of a legal brief.49  Justice Scalia, 
writing for a unanimous court, noted that this format did not, “in the 
circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of deference.”50  More 
specifically, in Auer, police sergeants sued city board of police 
commissioners under the FLSA for overtime wage benefits.51  The 
city board responded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to such pay 
because of their exempt status.52  Under regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary of Labor, one requirement for exempt status was that 
the employee earned a specified minimum amount on a salary basis, 
rather than an hourly rate.53   The Court held that the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the salary-based test was entitled to Chevron 
deference because it was a permissible reading of its own 
regulation.54 
 In contrast, in Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme 
Court ruled against the validity of an opinion letter when deciding 
whether the letter, promulgated by the agency to interpret a 
regulation, was entitled to Chevron deference. 55   In Christensen, 
Harris County wrote to the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour 
Division, asking whether it could require its employees to schedule 
time off in order to reduce the amount of accrued compensatory 
                                               
47 Yavelberg, supra note 23, at 167–68. 
48 Fiola, supra note 24, at 160; see also Yavelberg, supra note 23, at 168. 
49 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 455. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 462–63. 
55 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
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time.56  The Acting Administrator of the Division gave his reply to 
the county’s inquiry in an opinion letter.57   
Distinguishing Christensen from Auer, in which the Court 
held that the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation contained 
in a legal brief was entitled to deference,58 Justice Thomas noted in 
his majority opinion: 
 
Auer deference is warranted only when the language 
of the regulation is ambiguous.  The regulation in this 
case, however, is not ambiguous—it is plainly 
permissive.  To defer to the agency’s position would 
be to permit the agency, under the guise of 
interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new 
regulation.59 
 
Furthermore, regarding the application of Chevron deference to 
informal agency interpretive formats such as interpretive rules or 
opinion letters, the Court, providing some guidance to reviewing 
courts, explained: 
 
Here, however, we confront an interpretation 
contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, 
for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking.  Interpretations such as those in 
opinion letters—like interpretations contained in 
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not 
warrant Chevron-style deference.60 
 
 Shortly after Christensen, in United States v. Mead Corp., 
another important decision, the Supreme Court found the opportunity 
again to carve out more exceptions to the application of Chevron 
deference, further limiting an agency’s rulemaking power. 61   In 
                                               
56 Id. at 580. 
57 Id. at 580–81. 
58 Id. at 588. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 587. 
61 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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Mead, the Mead Corporation (Mead) imported “day planners.”62  In 
January 1993, the United States Customs Service (Customs) issued a 
ruling letter changing its classification of Mead’s day planners from 
an “other” category to “[d]iaries . . ., bound” category, subject to 
different tariff schedules.63    
The Mead Court thus confronted the issue concerning 
whether a tariff classification change in the form of a ruling letter 
was entitled to Chevron deference.64  Taking into consideration the 
limits of Chevron deference on agency interpretations, the Court 
stated: 
 
We hold that administrative implementation of a 
particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron 
deference when it appears that Congress delegated 
authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in 
the exercise of that authority.  Delegation of such 
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an 
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication 
of a comparable congressional intent.65 
 
Ruling letters, as the Court noted, “respond to transactions of 
the moment . . . are not subject to notice and comment before being 
issued, [and] may be published but need only be made ‘available for 
public inspection.’”66  Thus the Court held that the Customs’ ruling 
failed to qualify for Chevron deference because it fell far short of the 
notice-and-comment process. 67   Yet where Chevron deference is 
inapplicable, reasonable agency interpretations will be considered as 
persuasive under the Court’s ruling in Skidmore.68  Furthermore, the 
Court acknowledged that Customs could “bring the benefit of 
specialized experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case.”69  
                                               
62 Id. at 224.   
63 Id. at 224–25. 
64 Id. at 221. 
65 Id. at 226–27. 
66 Id. at 223 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a) (2000)). 
67 Id. at 231. 
68 Id. at 234–35. 
69 Id. at 235.   
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Finally, the Court noted that “[s]uch a ruling may surely claim the 
merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with 
prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight.”70 
Based on our analyses of the post-Chevron Court rulings in 
Auer, Christensen, and Mead, we can conclude that Chevron 
deference is applicable when the agency makes a formal 
adjudication, when it follows rulemaking proceedings by providing 
notice and an opportunity for individuals or groups to make 
comments, or when it exercises some other comparable 
implementations of law-making authority.  On the other hand, where 
Chevron deference is not applicable, the agency interpretations might 
nevertheless be considered persuasive by reviewing courts under the 
principles of “thoroughness,” “validity,” and “consistency” 
established in Skidmore.71 
 
2. The Controversy over “Chevron Step Zero” 
 
The initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework 
applies at all has been referred to as “Chevron Step Zero.”72  As 
analyzed above, in Auer, Christensen, and Mead, the Supreme Court 
considered whether Chevron deference applied to agencies’ 
interpretations depending on what types of procedures and actions 
those agencies took. 73   In other words, the binding effect and 
authoritativeness of a procedure was among the factors relevant to 
whether a decision carried the force of law. 74   The real concern 
behind the Court’s considerations focused upon whether Congress 
                                               
70 Id. 
71 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
72 Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman used the term “step zero” in 
2001 in Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (“Together, these 
principles comprise what might be called ‘step zero’ in the Chevron doctrine: the 
inquiry that must be made in deciding whether courts should turn to the Chevron 
framework at all, as opposed to the Skidmore framework or deciding the 
interpretational issue de novo.”). 
73 See also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (ruling that Chevron 
deference does not apply to the Attorney General’s interpretation because there is 
no general grant of rulemaking power to the Attorney General). 
74 See Mary Holper, Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 
1263–72 (2011). 
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had made an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to an 
agency.75   
The Court’s consideration of an agency’s choice of 
procedures constitutes only one aspect of the “Chevron Step Zero” 
inquiry.  Another important aspect of the inquiry is whether Chevron 
applies in the context of an agency’s determination of its own 
statutory jurisdiction.  Before the Court decided the issue in City of 
Arlington, the circuit courts had adopted different approaches in 
answering the question.76   
Besides those circuits that decided not take a position,77 two 
opposing views existed on the issue.  More specifically, one group of 
circuits had applied Chevron deference to disputes over the scope of 
an agency’s jurisdiction.  In Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping 
Authority v. Valley Freight Systems, Inc., for instance, the Third 
Circuit held, “When Congress has not directly and unambiguously 
addressed the precise question at issue, a court must accept the 
interpretation set forth by the agency so long as it is a reasonable one 
. . . .  This rule of deference is fully applicable to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own jurisdiction.” 78   Similarly, in Hydro 
Resources, Inc. v. EPA, the Tenth Circuit concluded that courts 
should “afford considerable deference to agencies interpreting 
ambiguities in statutes that Congress has delegated to their care, . . . 
including statutory ambiguities affecting the agency’s jurisdiction . . . 
.”79 
The other group of circuits refused to apply the Chevron 
framework to an agency’s determination of its own statutory 
                                               
75 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–20 
(naming the three cases Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 
(2002), a “Step Zero” trilogy where the Court attempted to sort out the applicability 
of the Chevron framework). 
76 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (noting that there was a circuit split on the issue); Pruidze v. 
Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 2011) (observing that the question remained to 
be resolved over whether Chevron applies to disputes concerning the agency’s 
scope of jurisdiction). 
77 See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237; see also O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 
176 (1st Cir. 1996) (leaving the question open); City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 248 
(“[S]ome circuits have thus far avoided taking a position.”). 
78 P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 552 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). 
79 Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1145–46 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(citations omitted). 
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jurisdiction.  For example, in Bolton v. Merit Systems Protection 
Board, the Federal Circuit reviewed an agency’s legal conclusion 
regarding the scope of its own jurisdiction and did not apply Chevron 
deference to the agency’s own determination.80  In Northern Illinois 
Steel Supply Co. v. Secretary of Labor, the Seventh Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion, holding that courts should conduct de novo 
review on an agency’s interpretation of its own scope of 
jurisdiction.81 
In view of such a circuit split, in City of Arlington, the Court 
sought to resolve the disputes and determine whether a court should 
apply Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of its 
jurisdiction under a particular law when that interpretation is called 
into question.  This represented the Court’s further effort to resolve 
the controversy over “Chevron Step Zero,” and to explore the 
limitations and boundaries of Chevron deference concerning the 
doctrine’s application.  Whether questions regarding an agency’s 
“jurisdiction” were somewhat special was the principal inquiry 
underlying the Court’s opinion. 
 




1. The Wireless Association’s Petition to the FCC 
 
On July 11, 2008, CTIA–The Wireless Association (CTIA),82 
which represents wireless service providers, filed a petition 
requesting that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
issue a Declaratory Ruling clarifying provisions in Section 332(c)(7) 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications 
Act), regarding state and local review of wireless facility siting 
                                               
80 Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
81 N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846–47 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
82 When the organization was founded in 1984, it was known as the Cellular 
Telecommunications Industry Association.  “In 2000, CTIA merged with the 
Wireless Data Forum and became the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet 
Association.”  Amy Storey, Is CTIA an Acronym?, CTIA–WIRELESS ASS’N BLOG 
(June 1, 2009), http://blog.ctia.org/2009/06/01/is-ctia-an-acronym/#. 
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applications.83  The petition alleged that ambiguities in the statute 
had made it possible for local governments to obstruct the placement 
and construction of wireless facilities, harming consumers’ access to 
wireless services.84  
 In particular, CTIA petitioned the FCC to clarify the meaning 
of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)’s requirement that zoning authorities act 
on siting requests “within a reasonable period of time,” and to 
“provide guidance on what constitutes a ‘failure to act’ for purposes 
of [Section] 332(c)(7)(B)(v).”85  The FCC was asked to specify “the 
time periods within which a state or locality must act on wireless 
facility siting applications.”86  Furthermore, CTIA suggested to the 
FCC that a local government has failed to act if there is no final 
action “within 45 days from the submission of a wireless facility 
application and within 75 days from submission of other wireless 
siting facility applications.”87 
 
2. The Communications Act of 1934: Section 332(c)(7) 
 
Wireless telecommunications networks need towers and 
antennas; local zoning authorities are required to process and approve 
siting facility applications for those towers and antennas.88  In the 
1996 Telecommunications Act, “Congress ‘impose[d] specific 
limitations on the traditional authority of state and local governments 
to regulate the location, construction, and modification of such 
facilities,’” and amended the 1934 Communications Act by 
incorporating those limitations and adding Section 332(c)(7).89  In 
addition, in Section 201(b) of the Communications Act, Congress 
granted rule-making authority to the FCC; the agency can “prescribe 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest 
to carry out [its] provisions.”90  There is no dispute that the FCC’s 
                                               
83 City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 233–34 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
84 Id. at 234. 
85 Id. at 234–35; 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2012). 
86 City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 234–35.  
87 Id. 
88 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2013). 
89 Id. (citing Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 115 (2005)). 
90 47 U.S.C. § 201(b); see also City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1866. 
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power in administering the law extends to the subsequently added 
provisions of the Communications Act.91 
Section 332(c)(7) was added to the Communications Act for 
the purpose of balancing two competing interests: on one hand, 
Congress desires to “preserve the traditional role of state and local 
governments in regulating land use and zoning”;92 on the other hand, 
Congress is interested in promoting “the rapid development of new 
telecommunications technologies by removing the ability of state and 
local governments to impede the construction and modification of 
wireless communications facilities through delay or irrational 
decision-making.”93  
Section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act is titled 
“Preservation of Local Zoning Authority,” which addresses “the 
authority of a State or local government . . . over decisions regarding 
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless 
service facilities.”94  Subsection (A) is known as the “saving clause,” 
stating that nothing in the Communications Act limits such authority 
except as provided in Section 332(c)(7).95  Subsection (B) identifies 
five such limitations, and only one of them, Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), 
was at issue in City of Arlington.  That provision mandates that state 
or local governments act on wireless siting applications “within a 
reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed.”96  If the 
state or local governments fail to act, Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v) permits 
the applicant adversely affected to “commence an action in any court 
of competent jurisdiction” within thirty days after failure to act.97 
 
                                               
91 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1866. 
92 City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 234. 
93 Id.; see also City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 115; T-Mobile, Cent., 
LLC v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 546 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir. 2008). 
94 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7). 
95 Id.   
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
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B. Procedural History 
 
1. The FCC’s Declaratory Ruling 
 
After receiving CTIA’s petition, the Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau 98  (WTB) issued a public notice 
requesting comments. 99   It was reported that the FCC received 
hundreds of comments from wireless service providers, local zoning 
authorities, and other interested parties. 100  Industry commentators 
supported the petition, arguing that the FCC had the power to 
interpret Section 332(c)(7) and that the FCC’s clarification of the 
reasonable time frames would promote the development of advanced 
wireless networks. 101   In contrast, state and local governments 
opposed the petition, contending that Congress gave the authority to 
courts, not the FCC, to determine what was “a reasonable period of 
time” and when a “failure to act” had occurred.102 
In its declaratory ruling released on November 18, 2009, the 
FCC agreed with the wireless providers, holding that it had the 
authority to interpret Section 332(c)(7).103  The FCC identified four 
statutory sources from which it received its jurisdiction power.104  
First, it contended that Section 1 of the Communications Act directed 
the FCC to “execute and enforce the provisions of the Act” in order 
to regulate the national wireless services.105  Second, the FCC argued 
that Section 201(b) of the Act delegated power to the FCC because 
the agency could “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this 
Act.” 106   Third, the FCC relied upon Section 303(r) of the 
Communications Act, which provides that “the [FCC] from time to 
                                               
98  WTB is a division of FCC that “regulates domestic wireless 
telecommunications programs and policies, including licensing.”  It also 
“implements competitive bidding for spectrum auctions and regulates wireless 
communication services.”  FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 
http://www.fcc.gov/bureaus-offices (last visited Jan. 4 2013). 
99 24 FCC Rcd. 13994, 13997–98 (2009). 
100 Id. at 13998. 
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 14001. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012); see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14001. 
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time, as public convenience, interest or necessity requires shall . . . 
[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and 
conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this Act.”107   Finally, the FCC argued that 
Congress granted authority to the agency in Section 4(i) of the 
Communications Act, which states that the FCC “may perform any 
and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, 
not inconsistent with this [Act], as may be necessary in the execution 
of its functions.”108 
In addition to relying on these statutory grants of power, the 
FCC also pointed out that the Sixth Circuit, in deciding Alliance for 
Community Media v. FCC, 109  held that the FCC possessed “clear 
jurisdiction authority to formulate rules and regulations interpreting 
the contours of section 621(a)(1)” according to its authority under 
Section 201(b) to administer the provisions of the Communications 
Act. 110   Furthermore, the FCC highlighted the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning that “the statutory silence in section 621(a)(1) regarding 
the agency’s rulemaking power does not divest the agency of its 
express authority to prescribe rules interpreting that provision.”111 
Disagreeing with the state and local zoning authorities’ 
contention that the FCC’s interpretation imposed “new” limitations 
on state and local governments, the FCC stated, “Our interpretation 
of Section 332(c)(7) is not the imposition of new limitations, as it 
merely interprets the limits Congress already imposed on State and 
local governments.” 112   Moreover, the FCC insisted that Section 
332(c)(7)(B)(v), the judicial review provision, did not by itself 
prohibit the agency from interpreting the provisions of the 
Communications Act.113   
Dissatisfied with the FCC’s ruling, several interested 
governmental entities filed another petition to the FCC for 
reconsideration, requesting the agency to stay its ruling pending 
review and any judicial appeals. 114   In its Reconsideration Order 
                                               
107 47 U.S.C. § 303(r); see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14001. 
108 47 U.S.C. § 154(i); see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14001. 
109 Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008). 
110 Id. at 773–74; see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14002. 
111 Alliance for Cmty. Media, 529 F.3d at 774; see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14002. 
112 24 FCC Rcd. at 14002.  
113 Id. at 14002–03. 
114 City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 1863 (2013).  
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released on January 29, 2010, the FCC denied the stay request and 
reaffirmed its declaratory ruling.115 
 
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Ruling 
 
Before the Reconsideration Order was issued, the cities of 
Arlington and San Antonio, Texas, filed a petition in the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review of the FCC’s declaratory 
ruling.116  In response to the cities’ contention that the FCC violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s 117  (APA) notice-and-comment 
requirements for rulemaking, the Fifth Circuit sided with the FCC, 
holding that the agency’s declaratory ruling was the product of 
adjudication, not rulemaking.118  Despite the fact that “agencies enjoy 
broad discretion in choosing whether to establish a rule through 
adjudication or rulemaking,” the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the 
APA still requires courts to review agencies’ actions to determine 
whether they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 119   After reviewing the 
records, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “any error in the FCC’s 
choice to establish the time frames in the Declaratory Ruling instead 
of through notice-and-comment rulemaking was plainly harmless” 
because the cities received notice of the issues and more than sixty 
governmental entities had the opportunity to submit their 
comments.120 
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Chevron 
two-step standard of review applies only when an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute is made within its jurisdiction; otherwise 
Chevron deference does not apply.121  The principal issue presented 
to the Fifth Circuit, therefore, was whether Chevron deference 
applied in determining the scope of the FCC’s statutory authority 
where the agency had been charged by Congress to administer 
                                               
115 25 FCC Rcd. 1215, 1217–18 (2010). 
116 City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 236. 
117  For details on the APA, see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/laws/administrative-procedure/553.html 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2014). 
118 City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 239–41. 
119 Id. at 241; see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 
797 (5th Cir. 2000); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
120 City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 245. 
121 Id. at 247–48. 
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Subsections 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v), and it had decided to adopt the 
90- and 150-day time frames.122  The FCC insisted that “an agency’s 
interpretation of its own statutory authority is subject to review under 
Chevron.”123  The cities, on the other hand, contended that the court 
should conduct a de novo review because the issue presented a “a 
pre-Chevron question of law.”124 
 The Fifth Circuit was well aware of the circuit split on the 
issue, and eventually sided with those sister circuits that decided to 
apply the Chevron two-step standard of review to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction. 125   Therefore, in 
determining whether the FCC possessed the authority to establish the 
time frames, the Fifth Circuit first considered whether Congress had 
“directly spoken in a manner that reveal[ed] its expressed intent.”126  
After analyzing the statute, the court concluded that Congress was 
silent regarding Section 332(c)(7)(A)’s effect on the FCC’s power to 
implement the limitations in Section 332(c)(7)(B).127  Furthermore, 
the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v), the courts’ 
jurisdiction review provision, did not resolve the ambiguity.128 
After its determination of Chevron step-one, the Fifth Circuit 
proceeded to a Chevron step-two analysis where courts must defer to 
an agency’s interpretation if it is a reasonable construction of the 
law.129  The Fifth Circuit found the cities’ arguments unconvincing 
that Section 332(c)(7)’s legislative history contradicted the FCC’s 
reading of the statute, that the FCC’s interpretation of Section 
332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations preempted a power traditionally exercised 
by state and local governments, and that the FCC’s exercise of 
authority conflicted with “the FCC’s own longstanding interpretation 
of its jurisdiction.”130  In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit held that courts 
must defer to the FCC’s interpretation regarding the agency’s 
exercise of authority in interpreting Subsections 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and 
(v).131   
                                               
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 248. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 248–49.   
127 Id. at 252. 
128 Id. at 250–52. 
129 Id. at 252. 
130 Id. at 252–54. 
131 Id. at 254. 
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On October 5, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the cities’ 
petition for writ of certiorari as to the first question presented: 
“Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least two other circuits, and 
in light of this Court’s guidance, a court should apply Chevron to 
review an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction.”132  The 
case was argued on January 16, 2013, and on May 20, 2013, the 
Court delivered a divided opinion. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S OPINION 
 
A. Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion 
 
Justice Scalia delivered the Court’s opinion, 133  which 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that courts must defer 
under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity 
that concerns the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.134  Accordingly, 
Chevron deference applied to the FCC’s declaratory ruling regarding 
the scope of its jurisdictional power.135 
Justice Scalia began his majority opinion by highlighting the 
canonical formulation of the Chevron framework in a court’s review 
of an agency’s construction of the statute that it is charged to 
administer.136  He pointed out that the background presumption that 
Chevron deference relies upon is congressional intent. 137   When 
Congress left a statute ambiguous, Justice Scalia explained that it 
“understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, 
by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to 
possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” 138  
Thus, for the majority, Chevron constituted a stable rule where 
                                               
132 See City of Arlington, Tx v. FCC, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2012/2012_11_1545 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).  Brief for Petitioner, at i, 
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11–1545), 2012 WL 
2516693.  A total of one hour was allotted for oral argument, which took place on 
January 16, 2013. 
133 Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion. 
134 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866–75 (2013). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1868. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 
(1996)). 
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“[s]tatutory ambiguities [would] be resolved, within the bounds of 
reasonable interpretation, not by the courts, but by the administering 
agency.”139 
 
1. False Dichotomy Between “Jurisdictional” and 
“Nonjurisdictional” Interpretations  
 
Justice Scalia stated that the so-called Chevron “step-zero” 
question regarding whether Chevron deference applied to an 
agency’s interpretation of its scope of authority rested on the premise 
that there existed two distinct classes of agency interpretations.  In 
his words, “Some interpretations—the big, important ones, 
presumably—define the agency’s ‘jurisdiction’” whereas “[o]thers—
humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff—are simply applications of 
jurisdiction the agency plainly has.”140   
Declaring the falsity of this premise, Justice Scalia 
emphasized that there was no meaningful distinction between 
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations, and any 
distinction would merely be “a mirage.” 141   Interestingly, even 
though the Court granted writ of certiorari to consider whether 
Chevron deference applied to an agency’s “jurisdictional” 
interpretation, the majority refused to recognize the existence of any 
meaningful category of “jurisdictional” questions.  As Justice Scalia 
concluded, “No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces 
when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it 
administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within 
the bounds of its statutory authority.”142 
The majority contemplated that the misconception about the 
distinction between “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” 
interpretations derived “from a reflexive extension to agencies of the 
very real division between the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional 
that is applicable to courts.” 143   Whereas there is a meaningful 
distinction in the judicial context, Justice Scalia stated, “That is not 
so for agencies charged with administering congressional statutes.”144  
                                               
139 Id.; see also AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999). 
140 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 1869. 
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The explanation for the difference is that Congress not only delegates 
powers to the agencies but also prescribes rules on how they are to 
act.145  Therefore when agencies “act improperly, no less than when 
they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires.”146 
 
2. Dangers of Labeling Interpretations “Jurisdictional” 
 
The majority used a hypothetical statute, the “Common 
Carrier Act,” to illustrate the impossibility of, or rather the 
meaninglessness in, separating jurisdictional interpretations from 
nonjurisdictional interpretations. 147   The danger of labeling an 
                                               
145 Id.  
146 Id. 
147 See id. at 1869–70.  Justice Scalia gave two formulations of the imaginary 
statute “Common Carrier Act.”  Id.  In the first version, the Act contains only one 
section: “The Agency shall have jurisdiction to prohibit any common carrier from 
imposing an unreasonable condition upon access to its facilities.”  Id. at 1869.  
Justice Scalia noted that the terms “common carrier” and “unreasonable condition” 
both define the Agency’s jurisdiction.  Id.  Under the petitioner’s proposition, 
courts must apply the de novo standard of review to determine the scope of that 
jurisdiction.  Id.   
In the second version, Justice Scalia formulated the Act slightly differently:  
 
SECTION 1.  No common carrier shall impose an unreasonable 
condition upon access to its facilities.   
SECTION 2.  The Agency may prescribe rules and regulations 
necessary in the public interest to effectuate Section 1 of this Act. 
 
Id. 
According to Justice Scalia, since Congress makes it clear that the agency has 
such power to interpret the statute for implementation, Chevron deference applies 
under the petitioner’s theory and courts must defer to the Agency’s interpretation of 
the terms “common carrier” and “unreasonable condition. 
 
Id.  
Through such a comparison, Justice Scalia questioned the soundness of the 
petitioner’s argument.  Id. at 1869–70.  He wrote:  
 
In the first case, by contrast, petitioner’s theory would 
accord the agency no deference.  The trouble with this is that in 
both cases, the underlying question is exactly the same: Does the 
statute give the agency authority to regulate Internet Service 
Providers and cap prices, or not?  The reality, laid bare, is that 
there is no difference, insofar as the validity of agency action is 
concerned, between an agency’s exceeding the scope of its 
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agency’s interpretation “jurisdictional,” cautioned Justice Scalia, was 
that it would become “an empty distraction” as “every new 
application of a broad statutory term can be reframed as a 
questionable extension of the agency’s jurisdiction.”148  Furthermore, 
Justice Scalia warned that it would be a waste of time for judges to 
do the “mental acrobatics” in making distinctions between 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdicitonal questions in order to decide 
whether Chevron deference applies.149 
The majority went back to the case law, identifying a number 
of examples in the Court’s jurisprudence to further support and 
strengthen its position.150  By creating a false dichotomy between 
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” agency interpretations,151 the 
Court cautioned that the ultimate target was Chevron itself.152  In 
Justice Scalia’s words, “Like the Hound of the Baskervilles, it [was] 
conjured by those with greater quarry in sight.”153  The consequence 
would be a transfer of “any number of interpretive decisions—
archetypal Chevron questions” from the agencies that implement the 
                                                                                                             
authority (its “jurisdiction”) and its exceeding authorized 
application of authority that it questionably has. 
 
Id. 
148 Id. at 1870.  One of the briefs supporting the petitioners explained that 
“[j]urisdictional questions concern the who, what, where, and when of regulatory 
power: which subject matters may an agency regulate and under what conditions.”  
See id.  Justice Scalia noted that all of these so-called “jurisdictional” questions can 
be “reframed as questions about the scope of the agencies’ regulatory 
jurisdiction—and they are all questions to which the Chevron framework applies.”  
Id. 
149 Id.   
150 See id. at 1871–72.  The cases that Justice Scalia listed include United 
States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009), FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833 (1986), Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985), and NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 
Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984). 
151  City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1872 (“The false dichotomy between 
‘jurisdictional’ and ‘nonjurisdictional’ agency interpretations may be no more than 
a bogeyman, but it is dangerous all the same.”). 
152 Id. at 1872–73. 
153 Id. (“Savvy challengers of agency action would play the ‘jurisdictional’ 
card in every case. . . .  Some judges would be deceived by the specious, but scary-
sounding, ‘jurisdictional’-‘nonjurisdictional’ line; others tempted by the prospect of 
making public policy by prescribing the meaning of ambiguous statutory 
commands.”). 
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statutes to federal courts regarding “how best to construe an 
ambiguous term in light of competing policy interests.”154  Justice 
Scalia thus warned that judges should not take away the rule-making 
power that belonged to the agencies, a constitutional concern that the 
Chevron framework intended to address.155 
 
3. Response to Federalism and Agency Power  
 
Rejecting the cities’ contention that the FCC asserted 
jurisdiction over matters of traditional state and local concern, Justice 
Scalia stated, “this case has nothing to do with federalism.” 156  
Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) of the Communications Act, as observed by 
Justice Scalia, required the local zoning authorities to make decisions 
about siting applications “within a reasonable period of time,” which 
served as proof that the ambiguity in the statute was “indisputably a 
question of federal law.” 157   Again, the majority warned that the 
federalism argument was mainly used as a disguise and the real target 
was Chevron deference. 158 
In response to the dissenting opinion, the majority stated that 
the dissent neither put up any defense for the “jurisdictional-
nonjurisdictional” line159 nor identified any case where “a general 
conferral of rulemaking or adjudicative authority has been held 
insufficient to support Chevron deference for an exercise of that 
authority within the agency’s substantive field.” 160   The majority 
                                               




158 Justice Scalia wrote, “We rejected a similar faux-federalism argument in the 
Iowa Utilities Board case, in terms that apply equally here: ‘This is, at bottom, a 
debate not about whether the States will be allowed to do their own thing, but about 
whether it will be the FCC or the federal courts that draw the lines to which they 
must hew.’”  Id.; see also AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 
(1999). 
159 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873–74 (“Perhaps sensing the incoherence 
of the ‘jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional’ line, the dissent does not even attempt to 
defend it . . . but proposes a much broader scope for de novo judicial review.”). 
160 Id. at 1874.  The dissent identified Mead to support its preposition that “for 
Chevron deference to apply, the agency must have received congressional authority 
to determine the particular matter at issue in the particular manner adopted.”  Id.  
Justice Scalia stated that he did not dispute that, but he emphasized, “Mead denied 
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rejected the dissent’s view that, before applying Chevron deference, 
courts must conduct a de novo review on each particular issue even 
when the agency’s general rulemaking power is clear. 161   The 
consequence of this rule, Justice Scalia warned, was that it would 
“render the binding effect of agency rules unpredictable and destroy 
the whole stabilizing purpose of Chevron.”162  Finally, the majority 
was unconvinced that applying Chevron to jurisdictional 
interpretations would “[leave] the fox in charge of the henhouse,” 
because such a distinction does not exist, and Chevron deference is 
sufficient to ensure that an agency does not exceed its power when 
interpreting ambiguous terms contained in the statute.163 
 
B. Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion 
 
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority of the Court that there 
is no meaningful distinction between jurisdictional and 
nonjurisdictional interpretations and the question that courts normally 
confront, which is “simply, whether the agency has stayed within the 
bounds of its statutory authority.”164  He cautioned, however, that it 
is not always easy to decide the statutory bounds under the Chevron 
framework.165  He further emphasized that “the existence of statutory 
ambiguity is sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion that 
Congress has left a deference-warranting gap for the agency to fill” 
because “other, and sometimes context-specific, factors” can affect 
the application of Chevron.166   
                                                                                                             
Chevron deference to action, by an agency with rulemaking authority, that was not 
rulemaking.”  Id.  
161 Id. 
162 Id. (“The excessive agency power that the dissent fears would be replaced 
by chaos.  There is no need to wade into these murky waters.”). 
163  Id. (“The fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by 
establishing an arbitrary and undefinable category of agency decisionmaking that is 
accorded no deference, but by taking seriously, and applying rigorously, in all 
cases, statutory limits on agencies’ authority.”). 
164 Id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
165 Id. 
166 Id.  The relevant factors that Justice Breyer identified include “[t]he subject 
matter of the relevant provision,” “the statute’s text, its context, the structure of the 
statutory scheme, and canons of textual construction,” and “[s]tatutory purposes, 
including those revealed in part by legislative and regulatory history.”  Id. at 1875–
76. 
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After considering a variety of factors in City of Arlington, 
Justice Breyer was satisfied with the application of the Chevron 
formula to the FCC’s interpretation, affirming that Chevron was “a 
workable way to approximate how Congress would likely have 
meant to allocate interpretive law-determining authority between 
reviewing court and agency.” 167   Rejecting the cities’ arguments 
about the “saving clause” and the “judicial review provision,” Justice 
Breyer concurred with the majority to rule in favor of the FCC, 
which, he declared, had the authority under the circumstances to fill 
the gap left by Congress through the application of Chevron 
deference.168 
 
C. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, Chief Justice Roberts 
delivered the dissenting opinion, declaring at the very beginning that 
“[m]y disagreement with the Court is fundamental.”169  Refusing to 
apply Chevron deference to the “jurisdictional” question, the dissent 
stated that a court must determine for itself that Congress has 
delegated power to an agency before the agency can issue any 
interpretations with the force of law. 170   In its City of Arlington 
ruling, although the Fifth Circuit “correctly recognized that it could 
not apply Chevron deference to the FCC’s interpretation unless the 
agency ‘possessed statutory authority to administer Section 
332(c)(7)(B)(ii),’” the dissent concluded that the Fifth Circuit 
decided incorrectly by granting Chevron deference to the FCC’s view 
on the “jurisdictional” question.171 
The dissent was deeply concerned about the growing power 
possessed by administrative agencies.172  Even though these agencies 
belong to the executive branch, in practice they exercise all three 
powers: legislative, executive, and judicial.173  Furthermore, federal 
                                               
167 Id. at 1876. 
168 Id. at 1876–77. 
169 Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
170 Id. at 1877–86. 
171 Id. at 1886. 
172 Id. at 1877–80. 
173  Id. at 1877–78 (“Although modern administrative agencies fit most 
comfortably within the Executive Branch, as a practical matter they exercise 
legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of law; executive 
power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judicial power, by 
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bureaucracy continues to expand and more new agencies have been 
created in recent years. 174   “[W]ith hundreds of federal agencies 
poking into every nook and cranny of daily life,” Chief Justice 
Roberts warned that presidential oversight would not always be an 
effective safeguard against the abuse of power by agencies.175  In 
particular, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the FCC is “routinely 
described as the ‘headless fourth branch of government.’”176 
Even though judicial oversight serves as another check on the 
power of administrative agencies, the dissent maintained that 
agencies enjoy broad power under Chevron deference to interpret 
ambiguous statutes over which Congress has delegated authority.177  
“It is against this background that we consider whether the authority 
of administrative agencies should be augmented even further,” Chief 
Justice Roberts stated, “to include not only broad power to give 
definitive answers to questions left to them by Congress, but also the 
same power to decide when Congress has given them that power.”178 
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s reasoning that there 
was no meaningful distinction between “jurisdictional” and 
“nonjurisdictional” interpretations. 179   According to Chief Justice 
Roberts, the majority made its ruling based on the wrong argument: 
 
The parties, amici, and court below too often use the 
term “jurisdiction” imprecisely, which leads the Court 
to misunderstand the argument it must confront.  That 
argument is not that “there exist two distinct classes of 
agency interpretations,” some “big, important ones” 
that “define the agency’s ‘jurisdiction,’” and other 
“humdrum, run-of-the-mill” ones that “are simply 
applications of jurisdiction the agency plainly has.”  
The argument is instead that a court should not defer 
to an agency on whether Congress has granted the 
                                                                                                             
adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have 
violated their rules.”). 
174 Id. at 1878. 
175 Id. at 1878–79. 
176 Id. at 1878. 
177 Id. at 1878–79. 
178 Id. at 1879. 
179 Id. 
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agency interpretive authority over the statutory 
ambiguity at issue.180 
 
Whether or not it is called a “jurisdictional” question, the dissent 
emphasized that it is the duty of the judiciary department to say what 
the law is.181  Before a court can apply the Chevron two-step analysis 
and defer to an agency’s interpretation when it is a permissible 
construction of the statute, the court must decide de novo whether the 
agency possesses the authority to interpret the ambiguity at issue.182 
 The dissent insisted that Congress’s delegation of general 
rule-making power to an agency is not sufficient to prove that the 
agency has power to interpret a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. 183   Relying on a number of decisions in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, 184  the dissent emphasized that “[w]e have never 
faltered in our understanding of this straightforward principle, that 
whether a particular agency interpretation warrants Chevron 
deference turns on the court’s determination whether Congress has 
delegated to the agency the authority to interpret the statutory 
ambiguity at issue.”185  Thus the dissent rejected the FCC’s argument 
that it could exercise authority over the particular ambiguity at issue 
because Congress had delegated general power to the agency to 
administer the Communications Act.186 
 The dissent criticized the majority’s approach of line-drawing 
between “jurisdictional” interpretation and “nonjurisdictional” 
interpretation.187  It noted that the type of “jurisdictional” question 
that the dissent emphasized would not be as difficult to distinguish as 
the type of “jurisdictional” question that the majority had 
identified.188   To further expose the weaknesses of the majority’s 
                                               
180 Id. at 1879–80. 
181 Id. at 1880. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1880–81. 
184 Id. at 1880–83.  The cases that Chief Justice Roberts listed include Adams 
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218 (2001), and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
185 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1881. 
186 Id. at 1883–84. 
187 Id. at 1884 (“As the preceding analysis makes clear, I do not understand 
petitioners to ask the Court—nor do I think it necessary—to draw a ‘specious, but 
scary-sounding’ line between ‘big, important’ interpretations on the one hand and 
‘humdrum, run-of-the-mill’ ones on the other.”). 
188 See id. at 1884. 
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reasoning, the dissent reused the majority’s hypothetical “Common 
Carrier Act” to illustrate its point.189  No matter how the “Common 
Carrier Act” is drafted, according to the dissent, courts always need 
to inquire “whether Congress has delegated to the agency authority to 
interpret the ambiguous terms, before affording the agency’s 
interpretation Chevron deference.”190   
Furthermore, the dissent rejected the majority’s concern and 
warning about the potential destabilization of the Chevron doctrine if 
courts are mandated to decide de novo the “jurisdiction” question 
regarding an agency’s scope of power.191  The dissent maintained 
that courts have never deferred and should never defer to agencies 
regarding whether Congress has authorized an agency to interpret the 
ambiguity in the statute.192 
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority’s view that it is “a 
judicial power-grab” if courts decide on their own whether an agency 
possesses the authority to interpret ambiguous terms, as those 
interpretations often carry the force of law. 193   Even though the 
majority’s opinion “touches on a legitimate concern” under the 
constitutional structure of separation of powers, the dissent reminded 
the majority that “there is another concern at play, no less firmly 
rooted in our constitutional structure.  That is the obligation of the 
Judiciary not only to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure 
that the other branches do so as well.”194  In addition, the dissent 
emphasized, “Our [the judiciary’s] duty to police the boundary 
between the Legislature and the Executive is as critical as our duty to 
respect that between the Judiciary and the Executive.”195   
In conclusion, City of Arlington has resolved, at least for now, 
the principal issue regarding the applicability of Chevron deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of its own scope of authority.  
Interestingly, despite Justice Scalia’s strong “anti-federalism 
bluster”196 in his majority opinion that “this case has nothing to do 
                                               
189 See id. at 1885. 
190 Id. 
191 See id. at 1185–86. 
192 Id. at 1885. 
193 See id. at 1885–86. 
194 Id. at 1886. 
195 Id.; see also Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012). 
196 Rick Hills, How Did Scalia’s Anti-Federalism Bluster in City of Arlington 
v. FCC Go Unnoticed by Six Justices?, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 24, 2013, 11:35 
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with federalism,”197 the dissent was silent on the issue and did not 
make any responses in its opinion.198  As one commentator asked, 
“Were Justice Kennedy’s clerks asleep?  Or did [the Justices] simply 
dismiss [the bluster] as dicta . . . ?”199  The dissent’s “silence” on 
federalism is certainly a “mystery” left to everyone’s speculation. 
 
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT’S DECISION 
 
A. The Judiciary’s Review of Administrative Agencies’ Rulemaking 
Power 
 
The majority and the dissent were arguing from two different 
angles about the appropriate power division between the judiciary 
and the executive when it comes to agencies’ interpretations of 
ambiguous terms of statutes as enacted by the legislative branch.  It 
seems to be equally true, however, that they both were concerned 
about maintaining the stability of the constitutional structure and 
charting out the proper boundaries for the three separate yet 
overlapping powers. 
Marbury v. Madison established that it is “emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.” 200   The reason that the executive branch is not allowed to 
interpret statutory ambiguities is because “foxes are not permitted to 
guard henhouses”; that is to say, “those who are limited by law 
cannot decide on the scope of the limitation.”201  Enacted in 1946, the 
APA is the basic charter that governs administrative agencies.202  To 
limit agencies’ rule-making power, the APA provides that “the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, [and] 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”203  Despite these 
governing principles, there were important contrary indications in the 
                                                                                                             
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/05/scalias-odd-view-of-
federalism-in-city-of-arlington-v-fcc.html. 
197 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873 (majority opinion). 
198 See id. at 1877–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
199 Hills, supra note 196. 
200 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
201 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 115 YALE L. J. 2580, 2584 (2006). 
202 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–557, 701–706 (2000); see also Sunstein, supra note 
201, at 2585. 
203 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
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Court’s jurisprudence before Chevron where courts suggested that 
agency interpretations would be upheld if they were made on rational 
bases.204   
The Chevron two-step inquiry that the Supreme Court 
established almost two decades ago officially acknowledged and 
confirmed the agencies’ rule-making power, which mandates the 
reviewing court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of statutory 
ambiguities if it is reasonable. 205   Yet in Chevron, as one 
commentator noted, the Court did not discuss Marbury or the 
governing provisions of APA; instead it put forward two “pragmatic” 
arguments: “judges lack expertise,” and “they are not politically 
accountable.” 206   More specifically, according to the Court, 
interpreting statutory ambiguities calls for technical expertise and 
political accountability, and therefore agencies have “conspicuous” 
advantages compared to courts.207   Furthermore, agencies can act 
more promptly and effectively to adapt statutes than courts, as courts 
are relatively decentralized and the judicial processes are 
considerably more cumbersome.208 
Therefore, even though Marbury holds that it is up to the 
judicial department to say what the law is, the Court has legitimated 
the executive’s rule-making power in Chevron regarding its 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms.  Borrowing one 
scholar’s words, this “reflects a salutary appreciation of the fact that 
the law’s meaning is not a ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky.’”209  
In other words, “the executive, with its comparative expertise and 
accountability, is in the best position to make the judgments of policy 
and principle on which resolution of statutory ambiguities often 
depends.”210 
The dispute in City of Arlington was over whether courts 
should defer under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
                                               
204 See Sunstein, supra note 201, at 2585; see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 
(1979); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 
(1941). 
205 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984). 
206 Sunstein, supra note 201, at 2586–87. 
207 See id. at 2587–88. 
208 See id. 
209 Id. at 2580. 
210 Id. 
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scope of authority.211  Essentially it was a “Chevron Step Zero” issue, 
which was distinct from the issue in Chevron where the dispute was 
over the agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity when the 
agency was acting within its jurisdictional power.212   Deciding in 
favor of applying Chevron deference to the “Step Zero” inquiry 
regarding an agency’s determination of its own scope of jurisdiction, 
the majority in City of Arlington followed the same path of reasoning 
in Chevron and further expanded agencies’ rule-making power.  As 
one commentator analyzed: 
 
For the majority, as dangerous as giving agencies 
broad interpretive power under Chevron may be, it is 
better than giving judges leeway to pick and choose 
when to defer to agencies and when not to.  Judges are 
even less politically accountable than are agencies, 
and more prone to generating disuniform 
interpretations of statutes based on ad hoc judgments.  
According to the majority: “The excessive agency 
power that the dissent fears would [absent a strong 
Chevron deference doctrine] be replaced by chaos.”213 
 
The decision in City of Arlington has the long-term effect of 
further strengthening and expanding the executive’s rule-making 
power, as courts are now required to give deference to an agency’s 
determination of its own scope of jurisdiction.  Concluding that 
courts should defer to both “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” 
interpretations made by agencies that administer the ambiguous 
statutes, the majority maintained that “judges ought to refrain from 
substituting their own interstitial lawmaking for that of an agency.”214  
By declaring that there are no meaningful distinctions between 
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations, the majority 
                                               
211 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2013). 
212 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). 
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refused to create any additional limitations on the applicability of the 
Chevron framework. 215   For the majority, the Chevron two-step 
inquiry is a sufficient protection device that can prevent agencies 
from acting irrationally or abusing the powers delegated to them by 
Congress.216 
Although it acknowledged the legitimate and canonical status 
of Chevron deference, the dissent disagreed with the majority that the 
doctrine should be further expanded to include an agency’s 
interpretation of its own scope of authority. 217   Rather, the Court 
should have continued the route that it took in Christensen and Mead 
to put further limitations on the applicability of the Chevron 
framework, and particularly, to instruct courts to conduct a de novo 
review when there are disputes over an agency’s interpretation of 
“Step Zero” jurisdictional questions.218   
Citing Marbury and the language and history of the APA, 
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the Judiciary should perform 
its duty to “police the boundary between the Legislature and the 
Executive” because an agency “acquires its legitimacy from a 
delegation of lawmaking power from Congress.”219  The danger of 
leaving the fox in charge of the henhouse is the accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands of the 
Executive, which may lead to “tyranny.”220  With the rapid growth 
and expansion of the modern administrative state, it is foreseeable 
that abuse of power can happen more frequently where courts are 
required to defer to an agency’s determination of its own scope of 
jurisdiction. 
The rather optimistic picture that the majority depicted and 
the relatively pessimistic picture that the dissent depicted regarding 
the political effects of agencies’ rule-making power should be placed 
side-by-side and viewed as a whole picture.  It is not entirely true that 
                                               
215 See id. at 1868–69. 
216 In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer did not share this optimistic view.  
He cautioned that the picture that the majority depicted about Chevron was too 
simple, because, in the Court’s jurisprudence, courts take into consideration a 
number of factors when applying Chevron’s two-step analysis.  See id. at 1875–77 
(Breyer, J. concurring). 
217 See id. at 1877–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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(Jacob Cooke ed. 1961). 
Spring 2014        City of Arlington v. FCC: Jurisdictional or Nonjurisdictional 185 
 
the distinction between “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” 
questions is meaningless and merely “a mirage.” 221   Rather, it 
depends heavily on where the line is drawn and how the question is 
presented.  As the dissent stated, drawing a line between “big, 
important” interpretations and “humdrum, run-of-the-mill” ones may 
well be difficult.  Yet “[d]istinguishing between whether an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous term is reasonable and whether that 
term is for the agency to interpret is not nearly so difficult.”222  In the 
City of Arlington case, for instance, neither the FCC nor the Fifth 
Circuit was confused about the “jurisdiction” question in their rulings 
and identified the issue correctly; that is, they were asked to decide 
whether the FCC possessed statutory authority to interpret Section 
332(c)(7)(B)(ii) within its scope of power as delegated by 
Congress.223 
On the other hand, the danger of confusion exists where the 
“application of a broad statutory term can be reframed as a 
questionable extension of the agency’s jurisdiction” 224  as the line 
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions is not always 
clear.225   On top of that, it is skeptical that the underpinnings of 
Chevron themselves are sufficient to limit an agency’s power when it 
comes to the agency’s determination of its own scope of authority, 
although one scholar has argued that “the considerations that underlie 
Chevron support its application to jurisdictional questions.”226  As 
deeply rooted in the Court’s jurisprudence and this country’s 
                                               
221 In arbitration, the power of an arbitral tribunal to decide upon its own 
jurisdiction is referred as “competence/competence,” which is an “inherent power.”  
Under modern international and institutional rules of arbitration, the usual practice 
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223 See id. 
224 Id. at 1870. 
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constitutional structure, unlimited and unchecked powers are 
dangerous, and could bring corruption and tyranny. 
Under the Chevron framework, if Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue and its intent is clear, “that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”227  The 
notion that Congress must speak with clarity is closely associated 
with the nondelegation doctrine, where it is widely held that Article I 
of the Constitution mandates Congress not to “delegate” its power to 
anyone else, and open-ended grants of authority are 
unconstitutional. 228   “It is tempting to object to Chevron on 
nondelegation grounds, because the decision grants the executive the 
authority to interpret the very statutes that limit its power.”229  Yet 
because the executive is politically more accountable than the 
judiciary, “an allocation of policymaking authority to executive” 
actually “seems to reduce the nondelegation concern.”230 
To guard against the abuse of power by agencies on 
“jurisdictional” questions, Harvard Law Professor Cass R. Sunstein 
proposed that “the principal qualification has to do with certain 
sensitive issues, most importantly those involving constitutional 
rights.  When such matters are involved, Congress should be required 
to speak unambiguously; executive interpretation of statutory 
ambiguities is not sufficient.” 231   This seems to be a workable 
solution to ensure proper power allocation among the executive, the 
judiciary, and the legislative, but actually, its effectiveness depends 
heavily upon the premise that Congress speaks with clarity and 
leaves no “gaps” for agencies to fill when dealing with those 
sensitive constitutional issues.  The reality, however, is that Congress 
often speaks with ambiguity either intentionally or inadvertently.  
Therefore, with the majority’s ruling that Chevron deference applies 
equally to “Step Zero” jurisdictional questions, the visible impact is 
that agencies now possess a higher degree of discretion in rule-
making and interpreting statutory ambiguities, which can be a 
                                               
227 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
228  See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
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blessing if its powers are used appropriately, or a disaster if used 
inappropriately. 
 
B. Power Balancing Between the Executive and the Judicial 
Branches 
 
When the Chevron two-step inquiry was first established, the 
Court applied the framework with inconsistency and did not 
immediately recognize its revolutionary nature or landmark status.232  
One scholar noted, however, “The doctrine quickly gained currency 
on . . . the D.C. Circuit, particularly among Reagan appointees like 
then-judges Antonin Scalia . . . who recognized it as a ‘landmark’ . . . 
for deregulation.” 233   Under Chevron deference, courts could no 
longer impose artificial “obstacles” “when an agency that has been a 
classic regulator decides to go in the other direction” or when it 
“simply sits on its hands and does not choose to do additional things 
that could be done.”234   
Since his elevation to the Supreme Court in 1986, Justice 
Scalia has been a staunch defender of and advocate for the Chevron 
framework.  For instance, in Immigration and Naturalization Service 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca,235 Justice Scalia drafted a concurring opinion in 
which he criticized the Court’s analysis of the question regarding 
whether the INS’s interpretation of “well-founded fear” was entitled 
to deference.236  Following the Chevron two-step analysis closely and 
strictly, Justice Scalia stated, “Since the Court quite rightly concludes 
that the INS’s interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain 
meaning of that phrase and the structure of the Act . . . there is simply 
no need and thus no justification for a discussion of whether the 
interpretation is entitled to deference.” 237   Furthermore, as to the 
Court’s implication that “courts may substitute their interpretation of 
a statute for that of an agency whenever they face ‘a pure question of 
                                               
232 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 
YALE L.J. 969, 980–81 (1992). 
233 Andrew M. Grossman, City of Arlington v. FCC: Justice Scalia’s Triumph, 
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statutory construction for the courts to decide,’” Justice Scalia made 
a fiery response, declaring that “[n]o support is adduced for this 
proposition.”238 
Similarly, in Mead, Justice Scalia defended Chevron’s two-
step analysis in his dissenting opinion, where the majority of the 
Court held that a “gap” alone was not enough to grant deference to an 
agency’s interpretation and a variety of factors must be considered in 
deciding whether Congress has granted interpreting authority to the 
agency. 239   Rejecting the Court’s holding that the agency’s 
interpretation qualified for Skidmore deference even when it fell 
short of Chevron deference, Justice Scalia remarked: 
 
[I]n an era when federal statutory law administered by 
federal agencies is pervasive, and when the 
ambiguities (intended or unintended) that those 
statutes contain are innumerable, totality-of-the-
circumstances Skidmore deference is a recipe for 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation.  
To condemn a vast body of agency action to that 
regime (all except rulemaking, formal (and informal?) 
adjudication, and whatever else might now and then 
be included within today's intentionally vague 
formulation of affirmative congressional intent to 
“delegate”) is irresponsible.240 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that one commentator announced that 
City of Arlington was Justice Scalia’s triumph, where a broad rule of 
judicial deference was adopted and the multi-factor inquiry relating 
to the application of the Skidmore framework was replaced by “a 
simple and easily administrable rule of deference to agencies that 
reasonably and authoritatively interpret ambiguities in the statutes 
that they administer.”241 
In City of Arlington, Justice Scalia consistently and constantly 
emphasized the importance of the clarity, certainty, and stability of 
the Chevron doctrine.  Calling the distinction between 
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations a “mirage,” 
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Justice Scalia stated that, if required to make such a distinction, lower 
court judges would be wasting their time in doing “mental 
acrobatics” in order to figure out whether an agency’s interpretation 
of a statutory ambiguity is “jurisdictional” or “nonjurisdictional.”242   
In addition, Justice Scalia also used harsh words in his 
response to the dissenting opinion, suggesting that Chevron itself was 
the ultimate target.243  The real concern that Justice Scalia had was 
about the stability of the Chevron doctrine, which would be 
“destroyed” if “Chevron Step Zero” jurisdictional questions are now 
subject to courts’ de novo review, as proposed by the dissent.  Justice 
Scalia warned that thirteen courts of appeals, in applying a totality-
of-the-circumstances test, “would render the binding effect of agency 
rules unpredictable and destroy the whole stabilizing purpose of 
Chevron.”244 
In defending the stability of Chevron deference in City of 
Arlington, it was Justice Scalia’s belief that the executive, with its 
comparative expertise and political accountability, is in a better 
position than the judicial branch in making policy judgments, on 
which the interpretations of statutory ambiguities often depend.  The 
establishment of Chevron deference about two decades ago has made 
a real impact on the executive’s actions in rule- and policy-making.  
For instance, E. Donald Elliott, a former General Counsel of the 
EPA, accounted that “Chevron opened up and validated a policy-
making dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the 
agency should adopt for policy reasons, rather than what 
interpretation the agency must adopt for legal reasons.”245  Although 
“the political commitments of reviewing judges continue to play a 
significant role in the decision whether to uphold interpretations by 
the executive branch,” 246  the upholding of the applicability of 
Chevron deference to “Step Zero” jurisdictional questions in City of 
Arlington would probably further reduce such attempts by the 
judicial branch in claiming its superior position in interpreting 
statutory laws.   
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 In terms of efficiency and predictability of the law, the 
majority’s ruling, compared to the dissent’s approach, should be 
credited with the merit of providing a clear and uniform standard for 
lower courts to follow in determining the applicability of Chevron 
deference within different contexts.  The reviewing court needs not to 
spend time and judicial resources to distinguish “jurisdictional” 
interpretations from “nonjurisdictional” interpretations, which, as 
discussed earlier, could be a daunting task under certain 
circumstances.  As George Mason University Law Professor Michael 
S. Greve illustrated, D.C. Circuit Judge David S. Tatel “is . . . smart 
and clever, and he decides more AdLaw cases in a month than the 
Supremes will see in a decade.  You don’t want to arm him.”247  
Moreover, because of the clarity of the law, it becomes easier for 
parties to predict the results of their legal disputes, and thus it would 
discourage litigation and give them the incentive to reach a 
settlement. 
Finally, City of Arlington’s long-term impact on the actions of 
the judicial branch has also been an interesting debating point.  One 
commentator noted:  
 
So long as administrative agencies’ activity generally 
falls short of the full extent of their regulatory 
authority—as it surely must, by a large margin, given 
Congress’s preference for capacious delegations and 
“moods”—Chevron at least stands as an obstacle to 
judicial decisions that push the agencies to undertake 
new missions that they would otherwise lack the 
political capital to carry out.248 
 
Thus it is likely that courts, instead of overturning the policy 
decisions made by the executive branch, would now turn to Congress 
and require that it speak with clarity so that there are no “gaps” for 
the agencies to fill.  In addition, the judicial branch is aware that 
there is certainly a real danger, as strongly voiced by the dissent, that 
the administrative agencies might abuse their powers because of the 
expansion of Chevron deference to the “Step Zero” jurisdictional 
                                               
247 Michael S. Greve, City of Arlington: Some Cheerful Thoughts, LIBERTY 
LAW BLOG (May 27, 2013), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2013/05/27/city-of-
arlington-some-cheerful-thoughts/. 
248 Grossman, supra note 233, at 361. 
Spring 2014        City of Arlington v. FCC: Jurisdictional or Nonjurisdictional 191 
 
questions.  One solution for the judicial branch to guard against such 
a danger is that the reviewing court would be required to undertake 
the hard work of statutory construction to hold an agency strictly to 
the Chevron standard where the agency must stay within the bounds 




Justice Scalia, a member of the Supreme Court’s conservative 
bloc, authored the majority opinion in City of Arlington, which was 
supported and joined by three of the four “liberals”—Justices 
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.  One commentator has made an 
interesting observation about this composition of the majority of the 
Court, suggesting that “this time around, the Court’s Chevron 
coalition may be more durable.”249   
Even though Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts did not 
see eye to eye in City of Arlington on the issue of Chevron’s 
applicability to “Step Zero” jurisdictional questions, it appears that 
they still “share the same concern, each struggling for a way to assert 
control over an administrative state that does not fit the 
Constitution’s separation of powers but is, at this late date, a fact of 
life.”250  Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the judicial branch 
should perform its duty to police the boundary between the 
legislature and the executive, and agencies should not be given any 
additional rule-making power to decide “Chevron Step Zero” 
questions. 
On the other hand, Justice Scalia prefers to defer to agencies, 
but he is not necessarily “soft” on them; he can use “the heavy 
artillery of thoughtful interpretation to limit the bounds of 
permissible agency action.”251  As one commentator observed, “City 
of Arlington sends a significant signal to lower court judges that, in 
reviewing agency readings of ambiguous statutes, they should remain 
in a deferential mood.  But judges and justices persuaded that 
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agencies have gone too far in exercising their powers are not without 
leverage to rein them in.”252   
 City of Arlington holds a special place and commands 
considerable importance in the field of administrative law.  Professor 
Sunstein, the former administrator of the White House Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, has remarked that City of 
Arlington is “an important victory” for the Obama administration that 
“will long define the relationship between federal agencies and 
federal courts.” 253   Another commentator has also noted that the 
Court’s ruling in City of Arlington “may mark the most ‘avulsive’ 
change in administrative law in at least the last 13 years.”254  The 
simple and easily administrable Chevron two-step framework now 
applies to an agency’s interpretation of its own scope of jurisdiction 
when there is statutory ambiguity.  It is foreseeable that this decision 
would further shape the operation of a modern administrative state 
and this country’s constitutional structure. 
                                               
252 Peter M. Shane, City of Arlington v FCC: Boon to the Administrative State 
or Fodder for Law Nerds? (June 6, 2013); Bloomberg BNA Daily Report for 
Executives B1-B5; Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 217, SSRN, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2284308 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
253  Cass R. Sunstein, Scalia Gives Obamacare a Big Boost, BLOOMBERG 
POLITICS (May 29, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-
29/the-biggest-supreme-court-ruling-you-haven-t-heard-of.html. 
254 Grossman, supra note 233, at 331. 
